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REFORM OF LEGAL PROCEDURE: RULEMAKING POWER FOR COURTS$
SVEINBJORN JOHNSON*

Gentlemen of the Indiana Bar: Tomorrow, I understand, you
will assemble in the capacity of specialists to devise, if possible,
an efficacious method of treating a grave social malady. The
gravity of the disease lies not so much in the intrinsic difficulty
of controlling it as in the handicaps put upon men who, because
of training, character and position, ought to, but do not, occupy
a position of leadership in combating it. The disease with which
you will deal, among other things, is legal technicality and complexity in judicial procedure, with particular reference to the
statement of the cause of action. This disorder, which, for the
sake of convenience I shall label procedural technicality, is a
disease of the childhood of society, and like measles and whooping cough in children, it is difficult to avoid, more or less painful
to the afflicted, and disagreeable to all who associate with the
patient. There is, however, the comforting thought that, like
our children, society emerges ultimately from this stage, through
a somewhat nondescript adolescence, to maturity. It is the
opportunity, as it is the duty, of the bench and bar to devote its
special training and its intelligence to the great task of purging
our social organism of certain parasitic growths which have
always been the outstanding characteristics of simple and primitive societies.
That legal technicality is a disease, not of the old age, but of
the infancy of a political state, history furnishes abundant proof.
The ancient Germanic law and the more recent Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence were extremely technical. In Scandinavia of the
tenth and the eleventh centuries, procedure, for example, was so
technical that the omission of a word from or the misplacing
of words in a formula, resulted in the defeat of a litigant and a
miscarriage of justice. If you, the members of this great Bar,
succeed in devising some means whereby the machinery of justice
may move more smoothly and with less creaking, you will lift
your state to a higher level of civilization and progress. I think
I can without presumption say to you that we on the Illinois side
of the line wish you well. We shall watch your progress and
$ An address delivered to the Indiana State Bar Association at Indianapolis, Thursday, December 18, 1930.
* See biographical note, p. 398.
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hope to profit by it, for we are not all so completely insulated by
layer upon layer of self-complacency, through which neither the
light of experience nor the fresh and stimulating breeze of discussion and debate can penetrate, as was one member of our
legislature two years ago who pronounced the Illinois system so
near perfection that it were useless to try and improve it!
I am informed that the program which you will consider contains two major propositions: first, respecting reform in the
system of pleading; and second, a proposal to enlarge the rule
making powers of the courts of your state. In the full confidence
that you will hear what I say in the spirit in which it is spoken
and look upon it as the plain and simple contribution which a
lawyer throws into the hopper where ideas are threshed and the
chaff winnowed from the wheat, I shall, with your kind indulgence, address myself to this problem. I deliberately use the
singular term, for it seems that, dealt with on sound principles,
the problem is single.
May I ask you to bear in mind that even if I speak in the language of dogmatism and with the air of confidence, I do so less
because I feel assured or inspired, for I am neither, but more
because I wish to avoid the tiresome qualifications in which modesty, especially when, assumed, ostentatiously clothes its assertions. The truth is that I shall almost certainly make very few,
if any, statements this evening, no matter how dogmatically they
may stand forth in words, about which I have not some serious
doubts. I have thought about these matters for some years; I
have formed tentative opinions; but I am satisfied that in all
cases my opinions may be unsound and that other views may
much more closely approximate the ultimate of wisdom.
Brought up in a so-called code state, subdivision two of section
359 of your code of civil procedure has a decidedly familiar
sound. I read the brief prescription which your legislature, in
1881, laid down for your complaints: "A statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action in plain and concise language,
without repetition, and in such manner as to enable a person of
common understandifig to know what is intended." I suppose
it is the experience of every lawyer and of every law student
trained in pleading under the so-called code system to wonder
why pleading often presents serious difficulties. Nothing could
be simpler, seemingly, than a requirement that the facts constituting the cause of action should be stated in ordinary and
concise language. The statute directs us to leave out legal
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conclusions of every sort; it directs us merely to set out the
essential facts which we think are at the basis of our cause of
action. Mr. Pomeroy, in his valuable work on Remedies and
Remedial Rights, interprets the codes to mean that a complaint
properly drawn not only does not disclose whether the action is
in tort or in contract, but that if properly drawn it should not
disclose such fact. That is to say, he is of the opinion, and such
was clearly the intention of the draftsmen of the Field Code for
New York, that only the facts shall be set forth and the legal
inferences from such facts shall be drawn by the court. Yet, I
believe it is safe to say that not a single court in any Code state
in the United States has put this construction upon these plain
words. We have drifted so far from the real intent of the
framers of the code that, as in the case of the Supreme Court of
your own state, in Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96, at page 99, and
decided only two years after the adoption of the Code, a complaint must proceed upon a definite theory and on that theory
the plaintiff must succeed or not succeed at all. The pleader, the
courts say, must impart a certain legal complexion to the facts,
clearly contrary, as it has always seemed to me, to the intention
of the framers of the Code.
The Supreme Court of your state in the later case of Oolitic
Stock Company v. Ridge, 83 N. E. 246, decided in 1908, denied
recovery to the plaintiff who proceeded in the trial court under
the Employers' Liability Act, which, before the case reached the
Supreme Court, was held unconstitutional, notwithstanding a
paragraph in the complaint contained a complete statement of a
cause of action at common law. The court held that since the
complaint seemed to be drawn upon a theory of liability under
the Employers' Liability Act, the action could not be sustained
merely because the complaint contained sufficient facts upon
which a common law liability could be grounded. It is difficult
to imagine a clearer case of violence to the letter and the spirit
of the law than is exemplified in the numerous decisions of your
court upon this question, and some courts have realized their
mistake and have departed from their early position on this
point, notably the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
It has seemed to me, however, erroneously it may be, that some
gentlemen, text-writers of eminence, and some courts of high
standing, who insist that the only criterion of the right to change
from one theory to another should be surprise, or its absence,
ignore considerations of vital, indeed, sometimes of controlling
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importance. It is not enough that it cannot be fairly said that
the defendant is surprised; if the effect be to deprive him of
independent legal or constitutional rights and thereby, perhaps
indirectly but effectively all the same, to create advantage in the
plaintiff, the switch should not be permitted. The Indiana court,
as well as some other courts, has not recognized this ground of
distinction, valid though it seems to be. It has arbitrarily and
in unqualified terms laid down the rule that the theory of the
case must be consistently adhered to and that no change will be
permitted although there are enough facts in the complaint
which, if pieced together aright, would justify relief of some
other kind or on some other theory than was in the mind of the
plaintiff's counsel when the complaint was drawn. I have felt
that the rule was technical, artificial and unsound, I cannot,
however, unqualifiedly subscribe to the sweeping statement of
Dean Clark of Yale,1 to the effect that it is immaterial whether
the plaintiff calls his action one of tort or of contract. On the
contrary, it is very material in many jurisdictions, New York,
for instance, upon the right of the plaintiff to obtain body execu2
tion whether his action is in tort or in contract.
1 Code Pleading, p. 176. West Publishing Company, 1928.
2 Reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Mescall v. Tully, and to Mr. Pomeroy's statement in his Remedies
and the Remedial Rights, section 573. With the timidity which should restrain one who speaks in circumstances not imposing the responsibility
which belongs to one speaking for a court, or preparing a text for the profession, it is suggested that both the court and the learned text-writer are
in error. The former takes a view which is so narrow as to be indefensible
in view of the language and purpose of the code provisions; the second
loses sight of certain fundamental principles which the makers of the code
had no intention to disturb. The code was intended to deal with procedure.
In the main, it was not intended to disturb substantive rights, or to disarrange or destroy rules of substantive law. While the demarcation between substantive and adjective law may be difficult to define, what is meant
may best be explained by illustration. The right to a trial by jury in
civil cases is, in some states, like Indiana, preserved in the constitution,
and in all states its extent is defined by statute. That right, when of constitutional origin, cannot be taken away without waiver, express or necessarily implied, by the party entitled to it. In certain actions at law, although not generally in suits in equity, the defendant is entitled to a jury
trial unless he waives it. If, therefore, as is sometimes asserted, the right
to switch the theory from law to equity ought to be recognized in all cases,
unless there has been actual and prejudicial surprise, the result may be
to deprive the defendant of a right or privilege which the legislature has
given or the constitution secured him. In the latter instance it cannot,
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The Supreme Court of Indiana, as have the courts of other
states, has often used language like this: "This section (359
Code of Civil Procedure) does not require more than is reasonably necessary to inform defendant fully and distinctly of what
he is called upon to meet." That is to say, the courts, speaking
in general terms, say to the profession, in effect, that a pleading
is sufficient if it informs your adversary of what the basis of
your claim against him may be. This is, in substance and effect,
notice pleading; and this closely approximates the language of
the Michigan Judicature Act of 1915. But what a mockery these
words are when we examine the decisions and see what actually
has been required by the very courts which have made these
liberal phrases.
I am here on short notice, and I had no opportunity to examine
your decisions in detail. We know that many courts have grossly
misconceived the purpose of the code and through misinterpretation of its language and misapplication of its principles, have
sent the plaintiff hence without relief because he brings an action
in trespass when he should have proceeded in case 3 ; that they
have ejected a litigant from the temple of justice because his
counsel neglected to allege some circumstance deemed necessary
to a complete cause of action, but the omission of which could
not possibly have misled any party interested in the cause ;4 that
they have withheld justice from a litigant because he supposed
that he would be able actually to prove negligence, when, in point
of fact, res ipsa loquitur, and the fact of the accident actually
declared the defendant's liability.5 We know that the defendant
has been mulcted, notwithstanding a meritorious defense,
simply because he did not state it with sufficient fullness, deeming himself entitled to prove it under a general denial ;6 we know
that many a just counterclaim has been denied simply as a penalty because some lawyer neglected to use a formula of words
indicating an intention to plead it;7 and that a party has been
defeated notwithstanding he allegeal all the facts necessary to
in the former it should not, be taken from the individual upon some vague
theory of repeal or amendment by implication.
8 Gordon v. Ry. Co., 195 N. Y. 137 (1909).
4 Scofield v. Whitelegg, 49 N. Y. 259; Tooker v. Arnoux, 76 N. Y. 397.
5 Orcutt v. Century Co., 201 No. 424; Ryland v. Du Pont Co., 93 Kan.
288.
8 Cone v. IMinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 33 Pac. 31, 35 Pac. 933.
7 Regan v. Jones, 14 N. D. 591, 105 N. W. 613 (1905) ; (Numerous cases
in New York, Wisconsin, South Dakota, etc., have so held).
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show title in himself, but failed to say that he had title.8 A
system of pleading under which occurrences of this type are common cannot be right; or if the system be right, the men who
administer it cannot be competent. I do not care which horn
of the dilemma we may select, there is need for reform; no
system should exist which can serve as an excuse or apology for
such acts of wanton injustice.
I suppose it is scarcely debatable that there are many things
amiss with our system of code procedure. Too many cases involve questions of pleading; and too many decisions turn entirely
upon such questions. I went hurriedly through the two latest
reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court of your state, volumes 199 and 200, containing an average of nearly 700 pages.
In each report, astoundingly, there were less than twenty-five
civil cases; all others were criminal law decisions, and predominantly liquor prosecutions. In volume 199 over 26% of these
cases involved questions of pleading; and in volume 200 the situation was almost the same, questions of pleading involving 33%
of the cases. I assume that on this point, however we may digagree upon practical remedies, all are agreed that such a situation should not exist. I believe every reputable member of the
Bar feels that it is in the interest of justice that technical questions of pleading be reduced to a minimum.
By actual count of cases in England during the years 1830-32,
approximately one-third in certain courts involved questions of
pleading; under the Hilary Rules of 1834, during the years 1846
and 1847, substantially the same situation existed, namely, one
case out of three considered questions of pleading. It is a fact
that although the Hilary Rules were expected to improve materially the procedure in England, the actual results were disappointing. Your own experience seems to approximate the common law and the post-Hilary Rules periods. When we come
down to the English Judicature Acts, under which the procedure
in the courts of England is regulated today, a different situation
confronts us. The Judicature Acts were adopted in 1873 and
1874 and brought about a radical change in English rules of
pleading and practice. The courts were given extensive rule
making powers. During the years 1907 to 1909, under the operation of tl English Judicature Acts, we find that one case in 76
involved questions of pleading. There must be an explanation
s McCaughay v. Schuelt, 117 Cal. 223.
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of this contrast with our own experience, and I suspect that
impartial students of the English system under the Judicature
Acts would find the reason in the theory of those acts themselves
and in the enlightened manner in which the judges of the English
courts have administered them.
In this connection reference must be made to the experience of
the Illinois Appellate Court to which come cases from the Municipal Court of Chicago. In that municipal court very liberal
rules of pleading were adopted. In 135 cases examined there
was a pleading question in one case out of 42, and but one
reversal. In the Supreme Court of Illinois, however, out of 558
cases examined in eight volumes of reports, during a period
practically contemporaneous, there was one reversal on points
of pleading in 14 cases, and one case in every four dealt with
pleading. A partial explanation of this condition I believe to be
the simplified rules of pleading in the Municipal Court, under the
able leadership of the Honorable Harry Olson, former Chief
Justice. I am glad that Chicago can thus in this instance invite
you to emulate her example.
The English are satisfied with their system; and the Canadian
lawyers are satisfied with theirs. In Canada I know from experience as well as from the lips of the President of the Manitoba
Bar Association this year, that their lawyers would not think
of curtailing the extensive rule making powers of the judges.
Reversals on questions of pleading under the English Judicature
Acts dropped from one in 44 under the old common law and one
in 33 under the Hilary Rules, to one in 605. There must be a
reason. For a large number of jurisdictions in the United States
there is one reversal in every twenty cases on points of pleading.
The Michigan experience is sufficiently interesting to deserve
more extended notice. In 1915 that state adopted a Judicature
Act. The adoption of the law was in some points a radical departure. It was provided that no declaration shall be deemed
insufficient which shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform the defendant of the nature of the case he is called
upon to defend. This is virtually an adoption of notice pleading.
It is still open to counsel to draw their pleading, apparently
either in the common law or in the code form, but in no event is
a court to reject a pleading as insufficient if a person is reasonably informed of the nature of the claim against him. Again,
demurrers, pleas in abatement and pleas to the jurisdiction were
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abolished. All questions, since the adoption of the Act, are raised
either by motion to dismiss, in the answer, or simply by a notice
attached to the plea. When the questions are raised by answer
or by notice the court determines them in advance of trial upon
four days' notice to either party. The party may amend, before
or after hearing, upon such terms as the court may impose.
I examined case by case the decisions in volume 247 of the
Michigan Supreme Court reports, consisting of 700 pages. I
found approximately 144 civil cases which had been before the
court; in only seven of these had any question of pleading been
raised; that is to say, one case in 20 had a pleading question in it
in the Michigan Supreme Court, whereas in volume 200 of your
state reports, approximately one case in three discussed a question of pleading. I am not sure what the explanation is. It is
probable that the attitude of the court has something to do with
it. At any rate, I would not attribute this striking disparity to
superior attainments of Michigan lawyers in the art of pleading.
I suspect that the liberal and simple provisions under the Judicature Act of 1915, to which I have adverted, are the true
explanation.
Some of us have grown accustomed to thinking that the code
was an improvement upon common law pleading. I find it difficult to give up this pet notion. The fact is I am convinced, almost against my will, after consideration of our experience under
the code as compared with the common law system, that the
improvement has been so slight as to be quite negligible. For
example, in the matter of reversals on questions of pleading the
common law states, at least according to one statistical examination, average one in 21, whereas the code states average one in
20. In affirmances the common law states average one in six, the
code states one in seven. It does not seem that the code has
materially reduced the number of cases which are decided on
pleadings. It has not, at any rate, effected any substantial reduction, such as we have seen took place under the English Judicature Acts. The code has not, by this test, operated to lessen
delay in litigation or prevent disproportionate expenditure of
time by the courts upon the lesser essentials of judicial administration. The time has come for the members of the Bar to
examine critically the actual operation of the code system. It
has been on trial long enough to enable us to make a just and
critical appraisal of its merits.
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I have already referred to the working of the code system in
several instances. It is noticeable that certain states have a
comparatively excellent record as far as reversals on questions of
pleading are concerned. For example, the state of Massachusetts, in a recent survey, reversed only one case in 92 on points
of pleading. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
made it known and has for many years consistently adhered to
the policy that it will avoid decisions on questions of pleading
in all possible circumstances, thereby discouraging the raising
of technical questions of that type. In Wisconsin the same situation has been developing in recent years, and the record of that
state is unusual. All of which, members of the Bar, after all
indicates that any system, including both the code and the common law systems, may be satisfactorily administer4d in the
hands of capable, conscientious and forward-looking judges. And
the best, the simplest system the human brain can devise, will be
imperfectly and badly operated by incompetent and narrowvisioned judges.
To speak of code pleading as a simple system I think is a
euphemism. Consider for a moment the voluminous works on
this system. There are Sutherland, Pomeroy, Bliss, Maxwell,
Elliott, to mention only a few of the very large number of bulky
works upon the law of code pleading. Look at Corpus Juris, volume 49, with its almost 900 pages, large and in fine print, on the
subject of pleading, much of which concerns itself with pleading
under statutes and under the codes. On the contrary, it has become tremendously and almost hopelessly complex and complicated. It is very probable that any system which may be devised
will, in the course of fifty years, become so loaded down with
judicial decisions and interpretations that a new order will have
to be brought forth. I suppose it is humanly impossible to avoid
the complexity which necessarily, it seems, under our system of
binding precedent, follows a long period of judicial interpretation. The English volume of Rules under the Judicature Acts
consists now of about 3,000 pages. All cannot be simplicity
where there are so many words. The courts should hold questions of pleading down to a minimum and not discuss them whenever it can be avoided.
In closing this part of the discussion let me suggest that permanent simplicity in pleading is an irridescent dream, so long
as courts feel themselves bound by every prior decision on a
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point of pleading. You lawyers do not help the court to shake
off the paralyzing hand of precedent in the field of adjective law,
even when the judges are so minded. If you find some technical
flaw in your adversary's pleading, you urge it upon the court;
and if the court ignores your technicality or holds against you
contrary to some dusty precedent, you file a petition for a rehearing or re-argument in which you emphatically remind the judges
and they must follow the law, or be damned ever after. It takes
more courage than average human nature has for the court to
stand against that sort of pressure. Once the mistake has been
made, there is little choice but go on; like Macbeth, the court
having "stepped in so far, that should I wade no more, returning
were as tedious as to go o'er." I have been on both sides of the
bar; I have been guilty as you have been of pressing a technical
precedent; and I have found it easier to wade on than to return.
The fact is that the system itself compels lawyers to resort to
these technicalities or else be charged with remissness towards
their clients.
I fear that do what you will, pleading and procedural reform
cannot accomplish all some of us expect of it. There is a deadline beyond which the best and simplest system is helpless. No
scheme you devise will absolve the lawyer from the duty of being
public spirited, the judge from the obligation to look to the
reason of the law as well as to its forms, and the pleader, last
but not least, from the uncompromising necessity of clear thinking and lucid statement. The clear thinker is a rare human
phenomenon; to him no system of pleading will offer serious difficulties. It is of the other type, less favored of nature, that the
law-giver must think; his name is legion; and for him the opportunity to make fatal pleading blunders must be reduced and
held down.
I suppose that one may justly class among the major activities
of the members of the American Bar the attempt to put control
of procedure in the hands of the judiciary. The dissatisfaction
existing throughout the country with judicial procedure is not
limited to the laity; it is manifest on every occasion where lawyers foregather. Unfortunately the laity puts the responsibility
for this condition upon the Bar; and yet the members of the Bar
are forced to practice their profession in conformity with rules
with the making of which they have had little to do. If it be
true, as it is sometimes justly asserted, that the trial of a lawsuit
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is in the nature of a game of skill in which technicalities are the
weapons and the contestants are lawyers, the fault is not wholly
our own. We are required to practice our profession in a ring,
if you please, constructed by the state itself; in conformity with
archaic and absurd rules which the state itself has arbitrarily
laid down; and with consequences resulting from failure to obey
the rules which the state has expressly or impliedly defined. It
is a consciousness of the irksome injustice of this situation that
has led the membership of the Bar to exert strenuous efforts to
have legislative bodies confer upon the courts the rule making
power.
It is a striking commentary upon the inefficiency of the state
itself that it should entrust to non-experts, largely laymen, the
power to make the rules under which justice is administered,
rather than put that technical task on persons skilled in legal
science. The public, through the legislature, tenaciously retains
the power to make the rules of practice and procedure in the
courts; and then, with brutal injustice and insincerity, holds the
bench and bar responsible for the flagrant abuses which from
time to time transpire in connection with the administration of
justice. In no other profession do we have such a situation. In
medicine, in engineering, in accountancy, the experts, the members themselves, are free to conduct their business and their. professions in keeping with rules of their own making best calculated to make them the most efficient instruments of public service. Not so the legal profession. In his essence and true character a public servant, with definite public duties and responsibilities to a greater degree than any other class of citizens, the
lawyer, whether on the bench or at the bar, is bound hand and
foot by regulations which he cannot modify, no matter how
absurd, archaic or impracticable they may be. In popular conception the entire duty and responsibility for the administration
of justice, civil and criminal, in this state and in this country,
is put upon the bench and the bar; whenever miscarriages occur
the public unequivocally puts the blame upon the lawyers and
upon the courts. And yet the bald truth is that in a great many,
if not in the majority of instances where flagrant miscarriages
of justice take place, the fault lies, not wholly with the courts,
not wholly with the lawyers, not wholly with both, but largely
with the rules under which courts and lawyers are forced to
work. It is my firm conviction that bench and bar can engage in
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no more serious and no more important enterprise, can have no
worthier aspiration, than to free itself from the thralldom of
rules thrust upon it by unskilled men without knowledge of or
experience in the law.
It is not without significance that in the judgment of every
responsible and competent observer who sees the English system
in operation, it works more efficiently than ours. It is not because Englishmen are smarter than Americans; it is not because
there is greater talent at the bar, or on the bench; it is not
because Englishmen have a superior genius for government and
administration than we have; it is, in my humble judgment, because, in the entire history of English jurisprudence, the control
of the courts over the administration of justice has never been
surrendered or wholly lost. The public there, as here, holds the
courts responsible, but there, and not here, the courts and the
lawyers have it in their power to change the rules so as to make
them instruments rather than impediments in the administration of justice.
Why is it that in the last twenty-five years in the United
States and in every state of the Union there have grown up
quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals outside the courts to
which have been transferred important judicial functions? I
refer to the various administrative boards and commissions
which have sprung up like mushrooms all over the land. It is,
I believe, partly due to the fact that the public has lost confidence
in the courts and in the bar and in the capacity of both to
administer justice effectively. The public, however, with the
supreme confidence and the short-sightedness of democracy,
failed to break the chains which bind the courts and the lawyers;
it created new tribunals in the vague hope that the evils would
be corrected. And is it not paradoxical that these extra judicial
growths all have the power to prescribe rules of procedure to a
much greater extent than the regular courts!
I do not wish to be understood as exonerating the courts and
the lawyers from all blame for the many blemishes upon the face
of American justice; but I do wish emphatically to put a large
share of the responsibility where it justly belongs, on the legislature itself, which with a tenacity more stubborn than enlightened, has insisted on keeping control where it had no capacity
to control, and in depriving experts of the right to control, where
responsibility nevertheless was exacted. The American Con-
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gress, in every instance in the last eighty years, when it has cre
ated a court or a tribunal, has given that body the power to make
its own rules of procedure and of practice. The Illinois legislature gave the rule making power to the Supreme Court in
1826, but unfortunately the Court did not see its opportunity and
took no firm action, and the power was withdrawn in 1829. Since
1910 the bar association of Illinois has been endeavoring to persuade the legislature to grant such power to the courts. The
courts are the ultimate repositories of justice and they should
be freed from the shackles which prevent them from performing
the function expected of them.
Under the British Judicature Act which went into effect in
1875 a few rules were laid down. The significant provision in
the act, however, was that which created a committee on rules
composed of eight judges and four lawyers. This committee
may modify almost any feature of English procedure, upon giving notice specified in the act, which I believe is forty days.
Parliament-that almost omnipotent thing in the English constitutional system-may modify or abrogate these rules, but it has
not in one single instance interfered or attempted to exercise
this power. I have been informed in conversations with members of the bars of England and of Canada that the operation of
the system is successful. It is satisfactory, it seems, or somebody
in or out of Parliament would have initiated steps to modify it.
Why is it that the Englishmen, aristocracy, capitalist and
laborers alike, have such confidence in bench and bar, whereas
our democracy seems to distrust both? Why is it that the states
are slow to follow the example of the federal government in the
field of equity as well as in all tribunals adopted in the last eighty
years, where the rule making power has been given and satisfactorily exercised? I am not aware that there is any movement
in any responsible quarter to change the situation and to deprive
the federal courts of their rule making power. It is true Congress has refused to give the Supreme Court the power to make
rules in law cases. This, however, is based upon the argument
of Senator Walsh of Montana which has no application when
the question is as to the advisability of giving the Supreme
Court of a state the power to make rules. Senator Walsh objects principally on the ground, as I understand, that if the
Supreme Court be given the power to make rules in cases at law,
there will result a divergence in the practice in the federal
courts and in the state courts.
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In 1927 the legislature of Delaware passed an act giving full
and complete power to the courts of that state to prescribe rules
of practice, pleading and procedure. The statute is very simple,
and I commend it to the consideration of those who are interested in this aspect of the matter. The power is given to the
Chief Justice and to the associate judges of the state of Delaware. After the passage of the act the President of the Delaware State Bar Association, the late Mr. Josiah Marvel, appointed a committee of the bar to assist the court in preparing
proposed rules. The bar committee prepared two drafts of
rules and submitted these to various law schools throughout the
country for criticism and examination. Thereafter a third draft
was prepared and possibly others. The judges at all times kept
in close touch with the work, but please observe that they cheerfully turned over the task of preparing the draft and of considering the principles on which the rules should be made, to a competent committee of the Bar Association. This is what would
happen in most cases, and it should be so. The court would
gladly accept, and should invite, if not offered, the cooperation
of the Bar Association in the tremendously important task of
drafting rules. The result would be a set of rules concerning the
administration of justice prepared in cooperation by the judges
and the lawyers. For the operation of a system under these
rules bench and bar should and would with propriety be held responsible.
You are about to face the real test of greatness. A system
concerning which there is so widespread complaint from the
leaders of the bench and the bar, is presumptively faulty. Will
you be great enough in soul, broad enough in outlook, discerning
enough in intellect, and endowed sufficiently with the spirit of
compromise and accommodation, so that you can agree upon
some efficacious plan of action? Lawyers may be able to agree
to find fault, but we find it difficult to agree on the remedy.
Success in accomplishing a real improvement is difficult at best,
but in the face of a substantially divided bar the case is quite
hopeless. There is an opportunity for some able lawyer to identify himself with a sound movement for reform, to lead in an
effort to make his state an example where justice is plainly,
promptly and easily accomplished, and to win for himself the
just fame of Bentham and Romilly in England. The situation is
a call to duty and a challenge to the capacity of your bar for
real leadership.
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